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We test for emerging economies the hypothesis — previously verified for G-10 countries only — that the 
enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) exerts a detrimental effect on the supply of credit. 
The econometric analysis on individual bank data suggests three main results. First, CAR enforcement — 
according to the 1988 Basel standard  — significantly curtailed credit supply, particularly at less-well 
capitalized banks. Second, such negative impact was larger for countries enforcing CARs in the aftermath 
of a currency/financial crisis. Third, the adverse impact of CARs on the credit supply was significantly 
smaller for foreign-owned banks, suggesting that opening up to foreign investors may be an effective way 
to partly shield the domestic banking sector from negative shocks. Overall, CAR enforcement — by 
inducing banks to reduce their lending  — may well have induced an aggregate credit slowdown or 
contraction in the examined emerging countries. This paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on the impact 
of the revision of bank CARs, as contemplated by the 1999 Basel proposal. Our results suggest that in 
several emerging economies the revision of bank CARs could well induce a credit supply retrenchment, 
which should not be underestimated.  
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1. Introduction 
  During the last decade an increasing number of emerging countries adopted stiffer 
rules for bank minimum capital requirements following the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
1988 Capital Accord proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for 
“internationally active” banks of G -10 countries. As a result, the Accord, initially 
designed to provide a level playing field for internationally active banks, has become a 
model for capital regulation of national banking system in both developed and emerging 
countries.  
Following the early phases of implementation of the Accord in developed 
countries, a widespread concern emerged about the possible negative impact that higher 
capital requirements could exert on the level of economic activity, especially during 
economic downturns. The intense debate led to a number of empirical analyses, which 
identified several cases in which binding capital requirements led to a sudden contraction 
of bank lending.
1 On the occasion, Mr. Richard Syron, president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, coined the expression “capital crunch” to characterize the simultaneous 
shortage of capital and the limited banks’ ability to grant new loans that occurred during 
the 1990-91 recession in the United States.
2 
More recently, following the widespread adoption of Basel-like minimum banks’ 
capital requirements, similar concerns have been expressed for emerging economies. 
Several authors have claimed that the tightening of capital requirements — or their more 
stringent enforcement  — contributed to the depth and length of the financial crisis of East 
Asian economies. The issue seems even more relevant for emerging economies than it 
might have been for G -10 economies given the larger role that banking systems usually 
play in the former countries. 
This paper provides new evidence on the effects that the introduction of Basel-
like capital requirements in emerging countries had on bank lending policies. Our 
purpose is twofold. First, we want to assess whether the different institutional setup 
prevailing in emerging economies with respect to G -10 countries affects the banks’ 
reaction to the introduction of otherwise similar capital regulations in the former 
countries vis-à-vis the latter ones. Second, our aim is to use any evidence of systematic 
effects associated with the implementation of capital requirements in emerging countries’ 
banking systems to provide guidance both on the definition of the new Capital Accord 
and on its phasing-in prescriptions. 
In order to offer preliminary evidence on these issues the paper extends previous 
empirical analyses in several directions. In the first place, we expand previous studies — 
focusing on single countries  — to a larger set of emerging countries.3 Secondly, rather 
than looking at individual countries in isolation, we group a relatively large number of 
emerging countries  — which have adopted and enforced capital regulation in the last 
decade  — and look at the statistical regularities arising from their joint analysis. Thirdly, 
rather than relying on aggregate data, we analyze the behavior of individual banks active 
in each selected country, thus being better able to identify supply-driven credit 
                                                                   
1 For an exhaustive and updated survey of the literature on the impact of capital requirements on the level 
of economic activity, see BIS (1999). 
2 Remark reported in Woo (1999), p.1.  
3 Previous empirical work on the impact of capital requirements on bank lending in developing countries 
includes Ferri and Kang (1999) and Ito (2000).   3
restrictions. Finally, our framework encompasses both shocks to bank capital arising 
from external sources — such as business cycle related losses  — and shocks originating 
from regulatory sources — such as in the case of an increase in capital ratios. 
  The evidence gathered in the paper points out three major results. First, t he 
enforcement of capital adequacy requirements negatively affects the supply of bank loans 
over a multiyear horizon and the effect tends to be stronger for initially less capitalized 
banks. Second, the impact of higher capital requirements is larger for t hose countries 
implementing enforcement practices in the aftermath of financial crises. Third, the 
adverse impact of more stringent minimum capital regulations on the credit supply is 
significantly smaller for foreign-owned banks, suggesting that opening d omestic banking 
to foreign ownership or to the entry of foreign institutions may be an effective way of 
shielding the domestic banking sector from negative shocks. Overall, higher capital 
requirements seem to exert a rather general and negative effect on b ank lending in 
emerging economies, whether affected by a crisis or not. 
Accordingly, our analysis suggests using caution in enforcing  — more than 
introducing  — minimum capital requirements in emerging economies, where financing 
channels alternative to the  banking system are generally weaker. Under these 
circumstances, the curtailing of bank loans could cause a depletion of organizational 
capacity in emerging economies’ corporate sectors with potential long-lasting detrimental 
consequences for these economies’ prospects (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993). Adequate 
phasing in procedures should, therefore, be considered for those economies which may 
face new and higher capital requirements as a result of the revised Capital Accord. By the 
same token, local supervisory authorities considering the opportunity of introducing 
higher than the Basel suggested minimum capital ratios or enforce sounder provisioning 
policies, need to carefully consider these effects as well. 
More generally, our analysis is consistent with the view that risk-based capital 
requirements can exert effective and positive discipline only in those countries securing a 
minimum set of preconditions  — e.g. adequate accounting standards, a proper definition 
of regulatory capital, and sound provisioning  practices. Where, instead, those 
preconditions are lacking and the whole burden falls on higher capital ratios, the 
restrictive impact on bank lending may have large negative effects on the economy. 
In the following we start surveying the considerable literature  — mostly referred 
to developed countries  — empirically assessing the impact of the enforcement of the 
1988 Basel CARs (Section 2). Section 3 outlines our methodological framework  — 
building on the seminal contribution of Peek and Rosengren (1995)  —  to identify the 
impact of the enforcement of the 1988 Basel CARs in emerging economies. Specifically, 
we single out crisis countries  — in which the enforcement likely took place under 
externalpressures— from the others. Section 4 describes the procedure adopted to select 
the sample of emerging economies and exposes our testing strategy. We present the 
econometric results in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The impact of CARs on bank behavior: previous contributions and open issues   4
  It is a well-known tenet that capital adequacy rules have an impact on bank 
behavior.
4 Specifically, the literature has focused on two aspects. First, it is believed that 
the introduction of capital adequacy rules will normally strengthen bank capital and, thus, 
improve  the resilience of banks to negative shocks. The second main affected area is 
banks’ risk taking. If, as it happens, capital adequacy rules establish higher standards for 
loans to the private sector than for credits vis-à-vis the public sector (e.g. Treasury 
securities), introducing these rules, might cause a shift in banks’ balance sheets from the 
former to the latter assets. 
Put in other words, the first question is whether banks fulfill the CARs by 
increasing capital (the numerator) or by reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator).  
The second question, instead, asks whether the stiffening of capital adequacy can lead to 
a contraction in banks’ supply of loans. Although the two issues are indeed related to 
each other — i.e. the contraction in loan supply can be the most effective way of reducing 
risk-weighted assets — they have been addressed using different methodologies. 
The two questions just outlined appear even more relevant for emerging 
economies. Regarding the first, in fact, banks might be more likely forced to reduce risk-
weighted assets when their ability to raise capital is impaired by shallow domestic capital 
markets, i.e. the typical situation in emerging economies. Regarding the second, bank 
lending represents a larger share in the corporate sector’s external finance in emerging 
economies, thus making them more prone to suffer from the ensuing restriction in bank 
lending. 
Regarding the first question, some authors provide evidence that banks change the 
composition of their assets away from  high risk-weighted assets when capital 
requirements are binding for them. Studies on this issue have mostly focused on US 
banks: e.g. Dahl and Shrieves (1990), Aggarwal and Jacques (1997), and Jacques and 
Nigro (1997) all offer evidence for US banks only. Some other contributions have tried to 
assess whether negative shocks to capital induced Japanese banks to restrict lending. 
Considering that a large part of Japanese banks’ Tier 2 capital consists of unrealized 
capital gains on equity investments, Kim and Moreno (1994) — on aggregate data — and 
Ito and Sasaki (1998)  — on individual bank data  — provide evidence that negative 
shocks to capital stemming from stock market plunges lead to significant declines in 
lending. Peek and Rosengren (1997) show that negative shocks to capital resulting from 
declines in the Tokyo stock market translate into curtailing loans in the US by Japanese 
banks and subsidiaries. 
  The second issue  — whether the stiffening of capital adequacy can lead to a 
contraction in banks’ supply of loans  — has been debated at length in trying to explain 
the early 1990s US recession. By historical standard such recession was rather mild and 
yet recovery was extremely slow. Various authors have suggested that the reason for such 
extremely slow recovery has to be found in the capital crunch, a particular type of credit 
crunch  — i.e. a retrenchment in banks’ loan supply — precipitated by the inception in the 
US of the Basel Committee capital adequacy standards. The consequent failure of the 
banking system to play its normal role in the transmission of the monetary policy 
stimulus would have prevented the economy from responding to sizable interest rate cuts. 
                                                                   
4 For general discussion, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994); Freixas and Rochet (1997).   5
According to the definition proposed by the Council of Economic Advisors 
(1991), a credit crunch is “a situation in which the supply of credit is restricted below the 
range usually identified with prevailing market interest rates and the profitability of 
investment projects”. Various reasons  —surveyed in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and 
Hubbard (1995)  — account for banks’ desire to retrench their loan supply following a 
monetary tightening or some other negative shock to the economy. It is argued that the 
introduction of the Basel Committee capital standards, induced a credit crunch by making 
loans more costly to hold for banks than government securities.
5 
Various authors, using different methodologies, have contributed to this 
interpretation. Some of the relevant papers have used cross-sectional bank-level data.  
Bernanke and Lown (1991) show that loan growth at individual banks between 1990:Q2 
and 1991:Q1 was positively linked to initial capital ratios. Peek and Rosengren (1995) 
introduce an influential method to address the issue of identification of supply-induced 
effects. Namely, they argue that capital-unconstrained banks should react to negative 
shocks to capital by intensifying deposit taking, thus, when banks are not capital-
constrained, one should expect a negative relationship between shocks to capital and 
deposit taking. On the contrary, they find a positive link between shocks to capital and 
the dynamics of deposits in 1990. They conclude this evidence suggests that the capital 
constraints for banks were pervasive as the Basel Committee ratios were phased in and, 
indeed, show that this impact is larger for banks having lower initial capital ratios. Berger 
and Udell (1994) concur that the expansion of loans was lower in 1990-92 for less-
capitalized banks, but do not detect a sensitivity of loan expansion to capital ratios higher 
than the one observed during the recession of the early 1980s. All in all, most 
contributions published on the issue
6 support the hypothesis that the capital crunch 
adversely affected loan expansion in the US at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Another episode that has received attention as one in which a capital crunch was 
likely refers to the Scandinavian countries’ crisis of the early 1990s. At the beginning of 
the 1990s Scandinavian banks were heavily exposed to the sharp economic recession and 
suffered significant loan losses and decreased profitability. Bank capital became scarcer 
not only because of the events above but also because stricter capital requirements were 
introduced in response by regulators in order to implement European prudential 
standards. Applying to the three Scandinavian countries the methodology proposed by 
Peek and Rosengren (1995), Minetti (1998) finds support for the hypothesis of a capital 
crunch for Norway and Sweden but not for Finland. In particular,  for Norway and 
Sweden   he detects a positive  relationship — and not  a negative  one  as it should have 
been the case  if banks were not capital-constrained  —between capital shocks and the 
dynamics of deposits.
7 
                                                                   
5 Following the 1988 Basel Committee rules, loans to the private sector require the bank to post a minimum 
of 8% in qualifying capital equivalent, whereas credits on the State sector bear a zero requirement.  In the 
US, Basel Committee  capital standards were formally approved in 1989 and phased in at the end of 1990. 
6 A notable exception is Sharpe (1995), who presents a survey of this literature and a critical review of its 
research findings. He argues that the evidence in favor of a capital crunch is far from conclusive, the only 
exception being the evidence for banking in New England where the support for the capital crunch is 
reasonably firm. 
7 Minetti’s lack of evidence of a capital crunch for Finland is consistent with the results of Vihriälä (1997), 
who also concurs on this finding.   6
The link between bank capital standards and banks’ loan supply came again under 
investigation in assessing the Japanese and  East Asian crisis. According to many studies, 
in Japan the fragility of the banking system was a major culprit behind the persistent 
crisis  — or lack of recovery  — the country experienced through the 1990s. The 
hypothesis of a capital crunch is also frequently cited as a possible explanation for the 
retrenchment in lending by Japanese banks, in light of both the increasing burden of 
NPLs and of the fact that Japanese authorities have paid more and more attention to Basel 
Committee CARs. Woo (1999) addresses the capital crunch issue on a cross-section of 
Japanese banks, using the methodology put forth by Peek and Rosengren (1995). 
Although he does not find similar results for the previous years,  the evidence reported 
supports the capital crunch hypothesis for 1997, possibly the year in which the 
enforcement of capital adequacy was stiffened the most. Regarding East Asian crisis 
countries, it has been noted that, in response to the crisis, all of them adopted measures to 
strengthen bank capital adequacy enforcement. Some authors have claimed that this 
contributed — at least partly  — to the East Asian credit crunch (Ding, Domaç and Ferri, 
1998; Ito and Pereira da Silva, 1999). Ferri and Kang (1999) address this issue for Korea, 
an interesting country to study since the decision to stiffen capital requirements was 
enacted by Korean regulators immediately upon the inception of the crisis. Once more, 
applying to Korean banks the methodology put forth by  Peek and Rosengren (1995) and 
controlling for each bank’s share of bad loans, they find a positive and significant link 
between shocks to capital and the expansion of deposits. They also show that those banks 
suffering from larger negative capital shocks e xperienced a more marked slow-down in 
the expansion of loans and increased more their lending rates. Thus, curtailing credit 
expansion could be the result of intensified credit rationing and/or of stiffer lending rates. 
On the theoretical ground, Holmström and Tirole (1997) develop a model, which 
provides a rationale for applying looser banking norms in recessions. In a model in which 
agents both in the real and in the financial sector may be capital constrained, Holmström 
and Tirole reach the conclusion that intermediaries should satisfy market-determined 
capital adequacy ratios but these ratios should be pro-cyclical, i.e. higher during 
expansions and lower during recessions.
8 
A comprehensive paper by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a) 
surveys the evidence for G -10 countries on the response of banks to the introduction and 
enforcement of the 1988 CARs. The paper’s main findings are that “there is some 
evidence that bank capital pressures during cyclical downturns in the US and Japan may 
have limited bank lending in those periods and contributed to the economic weakness in 
some macroeconomic sectors”. However, the report argues that for G -10 countries these 
effects ”may well have reflected both regulatory and market pressures on banks to 
                                                                   
8 Some authors even question the idea that enforcing increased capital standards would provide the proper 
incentives for banks to reach a more efficient allocation of credit. For instance, Hellman, Murdoch and 
Stiglitz (1999) argue that the net worth of a bank consists of two components. On the one hand stands the 
easily measurable bank’s paid in capital. On the other hand, the bank possesses a hardly measurable 
“goodwill” capital, stemming from its “informational capital” on borrowers accumulated through the 
effective but costly screening and monitoring of those borrowers. They argue that enforcing increased 
capital standards will lead banks to rely more on the paid in capital component to the detriment of the 
“informational capital” component. Accordingly, they show that enforcing increased capital standards may 
induce banks to “under-invest” in their screening and monitoring of borrowers, thus leading to a worsening 
– rather than an improvement – in the allocation of credit.   7
maintain ratios at least as high as minimum.”
9 In a recent analysis, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision  (2000) has argued that  — other things being equal  — risk-
sensitive capital requirements tend to increase the pro-cyclical nature of capital ratios and 
this, therefore, may exert an impact on the macroeconomic cycle. The analysis goes on to 
note that although the empirical evidence for developed countries  — as already 
mentioned  — is mixed, the relevance of the impact is likely to be highly dependent on 
historical and institutional factors and, more specifically, on the presence of an important 
bank credit channel in the economy. 
  Besides the possible impact of the introduction of bank CARs outlined above, 
there is one additional issue of specific relevance to emerging economies. Specifically, 
we contemplate the hypothesis that the impact of this regulatory restriction could be 
smaller if the ownership of the domestic bank is in a Western country.
10 
  There are various reasons why we could ex ante expect this to be the case. First, a 
significant entry of foreign banks may not only improve the efficiency of the recipient 
domestic banking market (e.g. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 1998; Clarke, 
Cull, D’Amato, and Molinari, 1999), but also stimulate sounder banking practices and, 
thus, render the domestic banking system more resilient to negative shocks. Second, 
foreign banks can perform a “stabilizing” role in emerging economies: to the extent that 
the local domestic market is not the bulk of their business, it is unlikely that a local 
negative shock will precipitate a systemic crisis for foreign banks.
11 Accordingly, in the 
face of a major shock, a large share of foreign banks might partially offset “lending 
channel” detrimental effects
12 vis-à-vis a situation in which only national banks lend in 
the domestic market.
13 Third, a significant presence of foreign banks might reduce direct 
capital flights when the shock occurs: depositors who perceive the heightened risk of 
domestic banks can flee to foreign banks in the domestic market rather than fleeing 
abroad. Moreover, if the banking crisis and the currency crisis are compounded, foreign 
banks are the most convenient way to “dollarize” domestic deposits.
14 Fourth, to the 
                                                                   
9 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a), p. 2. 
10 We exclude Japanese ownership because the Japanese crisis largely coincided with the period of 
observation — the 1990s — thus making it a possible further source of instability rather than a stabilizing 
factor (Peek and Rosengren, 1997). 
11 Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) have explored the link between foreign bank entry and 
occurrence of currency/financial crises in emerging economies. They find that increased foreign bank 
presence lowers the probability of systemic banking crises. However, we must distinguish between foreign 
banking in emerging economies carried out in the retail domestic market and international banking in 
emerging economies of the wholesale type.  Whereas the former may generally act as a “stabilizing” factor, 
the latter may be a “de-stabilizing” factor: e.g. Peek and Rosengren (1998) argue that Japanese banks’ 
curtailed wholesale international lending to South-East Asia contributed to the crisis. 
12 Obviously, this role of foreign banks in offsetting domestic lending channel effects should not be 
exaggerated.  To the extent that foreign banks tend to lend mostly to the top tier of domestic borrowers, 
when the shock hits, it will be impossible for them to reach out to smaller businesses with which they 
didn’t have previous relations. 
13 An additional reason according to which the presence of foreign banks may be stabilizing applies to 
countries that, having adopted a currency board, are impaired at providing lending of last resort to illiquid 
banks (Caprio, Dooley, Leipziger, and Walsh, 1996). In such a situation, at least theoretically, foreign 
banks could obtain liquidity from their mother country’s central bank. 
14 S ome hold that dollarization – the extreme form of currency substitution – would help defuse the 
problem of sudden stops and reversal in capital inflows which so often precipitate the twin crises (Calvo, 
and Reinhart, 1999). In fact, it is argued, explicit dollarization would avoid in emerging economies the   8
extent that domestic monetary/financial authorities have accepted a significant presence 
of foreign banks, they have “tied their hands” in the sense that it is much more difficult 
for them to distort the allocation of credit or extract regulatory rents from the banking 
system (Kane, 1998; 1999). In turn, a large presence of foreign banks is a potent 
reassuring signal. 
 
3. Testing hypotheses and methodology 
In choosing our econometric approach we were aware of the well-known problem 
of identifying supply-driven contractions in intermediation. A s we underscored above, in 
fact, such contractions may also stem from demand determinants. Accordingly, our 
results would be hardly interpretable if our approach didn’t pay enough attention to the 
identification issue. In view of this, the methodology we f ollow in our econometric 
analysis is the one proposed by Peek and Rosengren (1995).  The Peek and Rosengren 
framework can be easily generalized in order to model the effect that changes in capital 
regulation might have caused on deposits and loans of banks operating in emerging 
economies. In particular, capital shortages in the banks included in our sample may have 
derived from two sources: the first is given by loan losses, which forced banks to write 
down capital; the second is due to changes in regulation which raised banks’ capital ratio. 
In order to derive the implications of the two sources of shocks it i s useful to refer 
to the following simplified version of the banks’ balance sheet: 
D + (RK + EK) = D+TK=L + B          (1) 
where D = Deposits, RK  = Regulatory Capital, EK  = Excess Capital, TK= Total Capital, 
L = Loans, and B = Bonds. 
We also assume that capital regulation is defined by the leverage ratio: 
k = RK/L            (2) 
and that supply determined loans can be expressed as  
L = RK/k             (3) 
From equations (1) and (2) we obtain the following expression for deposits: 
D = L + B – (RK + EK) = RK/k – RK – EK + B 
which by total differentiation becomes: 
dD = ((1/k)-1)dRK + (RK)d(1/k) – dEK + dB       (4) 
As a matter of completeness, assuming that banks do not wish to change their 
bond holdings ( dB = 0), we can also totally differentiate the expression (3) for loans and 
have: 
dL = (1/k)dRK + RKd(1/k)          (5) 
Both expressions (4) and (5) are discussed within three distinct scenarios:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
build-up of currency mismatches, which trigger financial sector crises when capital inflows come to a 
sudden stop.   9
1.  the crisis case, when a negative shock to total capital affects bank lending and 
liabilities (i.e. DTK<0); 
2.  the regulatory case, when  a change in regulation raises the fixed minimum capital 
requirement (i.e. Dk>0); 
3.  the case of crisis with regulatory change, when the regulatory restriction takes 
place during a financial crisis and the previous two impacts need to be considered 
simultaneously. 
 
3.1  The crisis case 
It is easy to see from (4) that if the bank is capital constrained (dEK = 0 and dTK  
=  dRK), the impact of a decrease in capital (and in regulatory capital) determines an 
effect of equal sign (reduction) in deposits. Alternatively, if the bank is not capital 
constrained ( dRK =  -dEK and  dTK = 0) the impact will be of opposite sign. This is the 
case considered by Peek and Rosengren that we shall label as the “crisis case”. 
Following Peek and Rosengren we have that: 
1.1     DTK < 0    ￿    DD/DTK  > 0   if the bank is capital constrained; 
1.2    DTK < 0    ￿    DD/DTK  < 0   if the bank is not capital constrained.  
1.3    DTK < 0    ￿    DL/DTK   > 0   if the bank is capital constrained.  
1.4    DTK < 0    ￿    DL/DTK = 0   if the bank is not capital constrained. 
 
3.2  The case of regulatory change 
  Let’s now consider the “regulatory case”. Capital shortage may derive from an 
increase in capital ratio (here the leverage ratio  k). If effective, this exogenous increase 
will cause a reduction in deposits of the constrained banks (dEK = 0). The impact on the 
unconstrained bank instead will be null, since there will only be a substitution of excess 
capital with regulatory capital dEK=-RKx(dk/k)
15. 
Therefore in this second case we have that an increase in the capital ratio ( k = 
K/L) has a clear-cut impact on deposits and loans whenever the bank is capital 
constrained:  
2.1    Dk > 0    ￿    DD < 0   if the bank is capital constrained; 
2.2    Dk > 0    ￿    DD = 0   if the bank is not capital constrained; 
2.3    Dk > 0    ￿    DL < 0   if the bank is capital constrained;  
2.4    Dk > 0    ￿    DL = 0   if the bank is not capital constrained. 
Note though that an increase in the capital ratio ( Dk > 0) does not imply a 
predefined variation of total capital  TK. Still, where banks are capital constrained and 
have limited asset alternative to loans a positive correlation between changes in capital 
                                                                   
15 This expression can be derived substituting the relation, dRK = -dEK , which holds for  unconstrained 
banks, in equation 4.    10 
and deposits should be expected. In addition, the correlation becomes stronger with the 
increase of the leverage ratio (k)
16. 
 
3.3  The case of crisis with regulatory change  
  We are now ready to consider the third case in which capital shortage may derive 
both from losses and from the introduction of a more restrictive capital regulation. If the 
bank is capital constrained ( dEK = 0) we shall have a cumulative effect driven by the 
capital reduction due to losses (lower deposits) and by a higher capital ratio (lower 
deposits). The impact on deposits of the negative shock on capital, foreseen by Peek and 
Rosengren, would therefore be reinforced. If the bank is not capital constrained then the 
cumulative effect should be similar to that foreseen by Peek and Rosengren. In fact the 
increase in regulatory capital would be absorbed by a compensating reduction in excess 
capital (dEK = dRK) with no effects on deposits (eq. 2.2) while the negative shock to total 
capital would again be transmitted with a negative sign to deposits (eq. 1.2). 
  Looking at the loan side we can easily see that the increase in capital ratio (k) (eq. 
2.3) and the decrease in total capital (TK) (eq. 1.3)  will have a negative impact for capital 
constrained banks. The sum of the two effects in the “crisis” plus “regulatory tightening” 
is likely to have a magnified effect. 
3.1    DTK < 0   ￿    DD/DTK > 0   if the bank is capital constrained; 
3.2    DTK < 0    ￿    DD/DTK < 0  if the bank is not capital constrained. 
3.3    DTK < 0    ￿    DL/DTK > 0   if the bank is capital constrained.  
3.4    DTK < 0    ￿    DL/DTK = 0   if the bank is not capital constrained. 
 
 
4.  Sample selection and testing strategy 
We have just shown under the latter two scenarios the impact of a regulatory 
change and have seen that a regulatory change can only reinforce the effect of a crisis on 
deposits and lending and that it might have  as well a detrimental effect on the supply of 
credit if exercised in a stable economy. The next step is to test those theoretical 
hypotheses on a sample of banks operating in emerging economies. Although in principle 
interesting, we disregard the first hypothesis, i.e. the crisis case, given the sufficient 
evidence already provided in the literature.  
In particular, we need to identify those emerging economies in which capital 
requirements were not only subject to increase, but the increase was also enforced. It is a 
matter of fact that national regulators had a certain leeway in the effective enforcement of 
bank CARs. As a result, enforcement didn’t always follow the introduction of the 1988 
Basel CARs. This was the case especially in countries where the supervisory authority 
lacked the necessary strength and independence.  
In order to identify the emerging economies where bank CARs were effectively 
enforced, we made an extensive survey of the collection of the IMF Article IV 
                                                                   
16 From equation (4) we can observe that for a capital constrained banks (i.e. when dTK=dRK) dD/dTK>0 
if dTK/TK < (1/(1-k))·(d(k)/k).   11 
Consultation documents, considering all the reports from the last decade for a large 
selection of emerging economies. These documents offered us an independent and well 
informed assessment of whether  and when  enforcement had followed the introduction of 
the 1988 Basel CARs. 
In these documents we looked for a number of indicators of a more rigorous 
stance on the part of bank supervisory authorities. Among them, we considered: i) a more 
severe approach to provisioning practices (e.g. the introduction of more restrictive criteria 
in the definition of non-performing loans or more stringent provisioning requirements); 
ii) changes in the bankruptcy regulation; iii) the implementation of bank restructuring 
programs and/or reorganization of bank supervisory agencies. 
On the basis of these indicators we detected 16 countries in which the introduction 
or the revision of capital requirements was accompanied by measures of more effective 
supervision. For each of them we have also identified the year in which these measures 
were taken. This group includes 10 countries in which the regulatory change happened in 
conjunction with an exchange rate and/or financial crisis (Argentina, Brazil, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela)
17 and other 5 non-crisis 
countries (Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). A sixth non-crisis country 
(Morocco) had to be eliminated due to the lack of data on bank loans and deposits 
associated to different accounting procedures of Islamic banking. We also contemplated 
the possibility of different degrees of enforcement, identifying a subset of 10 countries 
for which the evidence of enforcement is more convincing. In this latter group the crisis 
countries were 8 and the non-crisis 2. A more detailed description of the change in 
legislation occurred in each country and the year of enforcement is contained in Table 1 
(for crisis countries), in Table 2 (for non-crisis countries), and in Table 3 (for countries 
that were considered but not included due to lack of evidence). 
On the basis of the 15 selected countries we then verified the number of banks for 
which we have (from Bankscope) the balance sheet/profit and loss accounts in the years 
which precede and follow the enforcement date, as required for the empirical analysis. In 
the 15 countries previously listed we were able to select 572 banks (474 for crisis 
countries and 98 for non-crisis countries). Table 4 contains the sample composition by 
country, including also additional information on: (i) the percentage of banks with 
foreign ownership in Western countries; (ii) the percentage of banks that were 
undercapitalized in the pre-enforcement year; and (iii) the percentage of banks suffering 
an asset reduction either at year  t or at year ( t+1) or at year ( t+2).
18 The largest 
percentage of banks included in the sample are Brazilian and Indian, the smallest those of 
Venezuela and Slovenia. India is also the country with the lowest foreign presence in the 
banking sector (only 4%), but it is worth noticing that Western ownership is on average 
larger  in non-crisis than in crisis countries. Venezuela had the largest percentage both of 
undercapitalized banks and of banks suffering an asset reduction either in the year of 
enforcement or in the following two years. 
The specific international composition of our sample might well affect the 
empirical results, although we will control for this problem as accurately as possible. 
Still, it is not an easy task to disentangle the effect of the enforcement of CARs in 
                                                                   
17 We identified crisis countries according to the two lists provided in Detragiache and Demirgüç-Kunt 
(1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
18 Including these two variables in the empirical analysis is important for the reasons stated above.   12 
emerging economies, especially for those economies contemporaneously experiencing a 
financial crisis. In Section 3 we pointed out a transmission mechanism caused by a 
financial tightening and/or a regulatory shock, originating from a contraction in assets 
and especially affecting capital constrained banks. In Table 4 column 3 we make an 
attempt to evaluate the potentially capital constrained banks in our sample; we do this by 
computing the percentage of banks with CARs lower than the sample median by country, 
at the year preceding the enforcement. This p roxy is the best we could find, given the 
limited information available on CARs regulation by country, especially before the 
enforcement. On average capital constrained banks, so defined, represent nearly half of 
our sample. An alternative and indirect measure is provided in the last column of Table 4, 
reporting the percentage of banks with a drop in assets occurring the years immediately 
following the enforcement. As expected, such percentage is higher in crisis countries, 
whereas the share of undercapitalized banks is analogous between non-crisis and crisis 
countries. 
Table 5 (for crisis countries) and table 6 (for non crisis countries) provide an 
overview of the trend in the most important variables in our study: they report by country 
the percentage change in assets, equities, loans and deposits occurring the year before the 
enforcement, the year of enforcement and two years after the enforcement. Furthermore, 
the two tables also show the evolution of the equity/asset ratio. Data in the tables were 
computed on a restricted sample excluding Western owned banks; however, the values 
presented in each columns are not strictly comparable, due to missing observations. 
At a first glance the capital asset ratio in all countries does not seem on average to 
have raised following the change in regulation. There are few exceptions, as Argentina, 
Paraguay or Turkey. Moreover, in countries like Venezuela, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea 
or Brazil, where the crisis was deeper, we found on average a substantial drop in assets, 
loans and/or equity. In general, there is no clear-cut evidence that equity increased (at an 
accelerated pace) with the regulatory restriction in most countries. In some countries the 
data show that (the rate of growth of) loans declined even significantly. 
Table 6, concerning non-crisis countries, shows a less clear trend. During the 
change in regulation three countries out of five, namely Hungary Poland and Slovenia, 
reported a drop in the average level of equity, or of deposits and loans. 
Nevertheless, the informational content of these descriptive statistics should not 
be overstated. Indeed, because of the international and intertemporal composition of our 
sample the descriptive statistics used so far are not informative enough and one needs to 
move into  the empirical estimation in order to control for potential heterogeneity. Our 
testing procedure is based on the construction of an international panel whose 
observations are centered on the year of enforcement. The panel we managed to assemble 
is an unbalanced one because of: (i) there are some missing observations across time, and 
(ii) the available time length varies by country. The construction of a panel is justified by 
the fact that the announcement of the change in regulation might have occurred at any 
time during the year (for instance in Venezuela and Brazil it was in June, in Paraguay in 
December). In general, we expect not to be able to capture the enforcement effect in the 
same year. It might instead be spread also over the following years. 
In order to test for the effect on deposits and loans of a shock to CARs, we use the 
Peek and Rosengren approach, but with some adjustment specifically tailored to our case. 
We do take into account explicitly the international and inter-temporal dimensions of our   13 
sample, by means of panel analysis and by including control variables for year and 
macro-economic effects. We estimate the two following regressions: 
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In (6) and (7) the variables  DTK,  DD,  DL are normalized by the beginning of 
period assets. The effect of a change in total capital on  DD or  DL is captured by the 
estimates of the  a2 and  b2  parameters, provided that potential demand side shocks are 
controlled for by the logarithm of total assets (Log(A)), and country/time varying effects 
are captured by the vector of macro variables X. Vector X includes real GDP growth, the 
local exchange rate as currency units per US dollar and the local nominal interest rate.
19 
The vector  t y D includes year dummies, having as reference category the year preceding 
the enforcement, and  L D e e,  are normal i.i.d. random errors. All remaining coefficients 
aim to disentangle the impact of a change in total capital on the dependent variable 
according to three different effects. Specifically, the first effect refers to initially 
undercapitalized banks, where the impact (identified by  a3 and  b3  ) is expected to 
decrease with the level of  banks’ initial  leverage ratio (capital  over total assets). The 
second effect regards banks suffering a drop in total assets (here the dummy  Dsh = 1,20 
which is the case for some 60% of the banks; Table 4), that evidently are in a wholly 
different situation than the other banks. The third effect concerns banks that are owned by 
foreign Western investors (here the dummy Dfb = 1, which is the case for one out of four 
banks; Table 4). For the reasons outlined above, these banks may be better fit to cope 
with the regulatory restriction. 
This methodology can be applied straightforwardly to banks in crisis countries. 
Indeed, in crisis countries banks normally suffer negative shocks to their capital. Our 
expectation is that not only  DL/A will be positively related to the change in the bank 
capital endowment, but also  DD/A will exhibit the same feature. Should we obtain this 
result, we will be able to claim that the capital constraints associated with the 
enforcement of the CARs did shrink bank intermediation, thus further reducing the 
supply of credit. Such a result should be reinforced where the negative impact of a crisis 
on bank capital has been strengthened by a more severe enforcement discipline. Typically 
we would expect the effect of the change in capital to be smaller for banks which have a 
higher initial leverage ratio (i.e. Capital/Total assets) and correspondingly we expect  the 
estimates of the a3 and b3 coefficients to be negative, proving that the effect of the change 
in capital decreases when the ratio of capital over total assets increases.  
                                                                   
19 Source: International Financial Statistics by the IMF. 
20 The dichotomous variable Dsh takes the value 1 if there is  a contraction in total asset at the time of the 
enforcement or within two years, 0 otherwise.    14 
On the contrary, this methodology d oes not deliver easily interpretable results for 
non-crisis countries. There is, in fact, no guarantee that negative capital shocks will 
prevail for banks in countries that are enforcing CARs during a non-crisis period. In this 
case, however, any attempt t o distinguish approximately ( ex ante) capital constrained 
banks from those unconstrained runs into a small sample problem, since the non crisis 
sample only includes 98 banks.
21 In light of this problem, we chose to evaluate the effect 
of the change in capital on deposits and loans only for low capitalized banks, interacting 
the dummy Dlow with the change in total equity:
22 
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Alternatively, we could replace  Dlow in (8) and (9) with the dummy ( Dsh) 
selecting those banks experiencing a drop in assets, which itself supposedly identifies 
undercapitalized banks forced to reducing their assets to meet their CAR obligations. In 
equations (8) and (9) therefore some of the regressors included in the crisis and 
regulatory case have been left aside. The reason has already been clarified in Section 3.2: 
showing a positive correlation between the change in deposits and loans and in total 
capital as only confined to capital constrained banks. Finally, it is worth stating that both 
sets of equations (6)-(7) and (8)-(9) are reduced forms of the systems exposed in Section 
3.3 and Section 3.2 respectively. In our reduced forms, the impact on deposits and loans 
of a change in CAR regulations will be indirectly estimated only through the effect of the 
change in total capital.  
 
5.  The empirical analysis: main results 
5.1  Testing the crisis with regulatory change hypothesis 
The empirical estimates of equations (6) and (7) for banks in crisis countries are 
reported in Table 7. The results are obtained by means of panel analysis, controlling for 
bank fixed effects and for country trends in both the financial and the real sector. 
The effect of changes in capital on both the change in deposits and the change in 
loans is strong and consistent with the theory. As predicted by the theoretical analysis of 
the crisis case with regulatory enforcement, changes in deposits and in loans are 
                                                                   
21 Were it feasible to regress equations (6) and (7) above separately for the two classes of banks, we would 
expect that a2 and b2 be insignificant for the unconstrained banks but significant — and positive — for the 
constrained banks. Alternatively, we would expect that a2 and b2 be significant for both classes but their 
size be smaller for unconstrained than for constrained banks. 
22 The dummy Dlow takes the value 1 if the bank has a capital asset ratio lower than the country median the 
year before the enforcement, 0 otherwise.   15 
positively affected by changes in capital, and  the effect is larger for low capitalized 
banks.  The  a3  parameter in the deposit regression is negative and strongly significant and, 
in addition, the coefficient of the  low capitalization proxy  Dsh  is significant in the loan 
equation. Moreover, in both equations, though neater in the loan regression, the capital 
crunch effect is generally weaker for foreign owned banks. This is shown by the fact that 
the change in capital, when interacted with the dummy  Dfb, takes a negative coefficient 
as opposed to the estimated value found for the variation in capital on its own. Indeed, in 
the panel estimation for the change in loans the specific effect for foreign owned banks is 
negative and larger in size than the impact of changes in capital of their own, suggesting 
that the capital crunch effect does not regard foreign owned banks. 
Note that in both regressions the time dummies, having as reference category the 
year prior to the enforcement, are all negative and generally significant. This result seems 
consistent with the hypothesis that the negative impact of the regulatory change spans 
also to the year following the enforcement.
23 We also find  that all the results mentioned 
so far are much weaker two years after the enforcement, which suggests crisis economies 
possess some capacity to respond to the financial crisis.  
To check for the robustness of our results, in addition to the panel, we report in 
Tables 8 and 9 the cross section OLS estimates of equations (6) and (7) restricted to the 
year of the enforcement and the year after. The evidence found is weaker, though still 
generally consistent with previous results. In the deposit equation, the e ffect of the slow 
down in capital accumulation due to the joint effect of the crisis and the rise in CAR is 
significant at the 10% level at time t and at the 1% level in year t+1. This result might be 
driven by the regulation enforcement becoming effective only in  t+1  in countries — such 
as Malaysia, Korea, Thailand and Paraguay  — where the CAR enforcement happened 
towards the end of the year. In the loan regression, instead, the coefficient of the change 
in capital is positive and significant in both years, suggesting the presence of a credit 
crunch immediately upon the regulatory enforcement. The evidence of no capital crunch 
found for foreign banks in the panel regression is visible only one year after the 
announcement for the loans while it is not evident for deposits. 
In order to corroborate the conclusions found we also regress equations (6) and 
(7) selecting crisis countries where we found strong supporting evidence of the 
enforcement taking place. The results are analogous to the ones obtained for the full 
sample of crisis countries (Table 10). This reinforces the case that, in  emerging 
economies, one should not underestimate the possibility of a credit supply retrenchment 
induced by CAR revision. 
 
5.2  Testing the regulatory change hypothesis 
The theoretical analysis exposed in Section 3 found that even when exerted in a 
stable economy, the enforcement of capital asset requirements can  curtail credit supply, 
particularly if less-well capitalized banks are the main source of financial intermediation. 
However, d ue to small sample problems, we could not restrict our tests to 
undercapitalized banks only. Instead, we create a dichotomous variable ( Dlow) for 
                                                                   
23 We need however to state a caveat. We cannot exclude that our result is driven by simultaneous business 
cycle effects  — possibly not adequately controlled by the macro variables included — or simply by 
differences in the sample composition — due to the unbalanced nature of our panel.   16 
undercapitalized financial institutions using as the cut-off point the median of the capital 
asset ratio by country, computed the year before the enforcement. Adopting the 
specification (8) and (9), we then interact the computed variable Dlow with the change in 
capital, in order to capture the difference in the banking response to the regulatory shock, 
underlined in Section 3. In (8) and (9) the effects of foreign banks is disregarded, since 
they were mostly well-capitalized.  
The empirical results of the panel analysis are contained in Table 11 and are 
obtained restricting the sample period to the enforcement year and to the two following 
years. Compared with the results of the crisis case, we find similar or even neater 
evidence. Both changes in deposits and loans are positively correlated with changes in 
capital for under-capitalized banks and the estimated coefficients are even bigger than the 
ones in Table 7. The main difference worth mentioning relates to the persistence of the 
effect of the change in capital. As opposed to the case of crisis countries, where it was 
omitted because it was insignificant,  this effect is still detected in year ( t+2)  — which 
therefore was included in the analysis — for non-crisis countries. 
While alternative interpretations cannot be ruled out, a possible explanation runs 
as follows. Crisis countries experience the CAR enforcement together with their crisis. If, 
as it often happens (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), they experience twin crises coupling 
the financial crisis with an exchange rate crisis, then this may help explain two findings 
of ours. First, we found that the extent of the capital crunch is larger for crisis than for 
non-crisis countries. This could be explained by the fact the CAR enforcement hits crisis 
countries, which are already plundered by the pervasive illiquidity associated with the 
twin crises. Second, however, we found that the capital crunch is less persistent in crisis 
than in non-crisis countries. This could have to do with the fact that the former countries 
— contrary to the latter — experience a sizable depreciation of their exchange rates, and 
this i s not only a curse as, at the same time, it also enhances their external 
competitiveness and helps their quicker recovery. 
We also implemented a sensitivity analysis replacing the dummy  Dlow  with the 
variable Dsh already used in the crisis case. The results are collected in Table 12 and they 
generally support the conclusions already drawn. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
This paper has provided new evidence on the effects that a stricter enforcement of 
minimum capital discipline can have on bank intermediation in less developed financial 
systems. In this respect, we have not limited our attention to the simple revision of capital 
ratios but have also considered those measures  — e.g. improving  accounting standards, 
adopting rigorous provisioning practices and more binding b ankruptcy laws  —  which 
make capital requirement more sensitive to the change in the quality of banks’ portfolios. 
Our paper offers a clear support to the general presumption that the “capital crunch” — 
the credit crunch associated to a stricter enforcement of bank capital regulation  —  is 
more pervasive in those countries where the credit channel is more important  —  i.e. 
where alternatives to bank credit are less developed. 
Notwithstanding the general recognition that capital regulation may have different 
macroeconomic effects according to the divers institutional and developmental 
characteristics of each economy, still we observe that bank capital regulation has not yet   17 
clearly addressed the distinct needs of less developed economies. More specifically, the 
recent proposal of a new Capital Accord set out by the Basel Committee in its 
Consultative paper still refers to the needs of “internationally active banks” and more 
generally addresses problems faced by developed countries’ banking systems. 
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on the new Capital Accord, 
stressing the fact  that  economies which mostly rely on bank credit may have to devote 
particular attention to the process of enforcement of a stricter capital discipline. The 
presence of different institutional constraints need not be read as an alibi for not 
modernizing capital regulation. It should instead motivate a timely revision of these 
constraints, on the part of the domestic authorities, and more differentiated regulatory 
options on the part of the international authorities setting regulatory standards.    18 
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Appendix  
Table 1: Identifying CAR Enforcement in Crisis Countries 
 




Evidence of Stronger Enforcement 
Argentina  1994  Good  •  CAR has been increased from 8.5% 
(December 93) to 11.5% (January 95) and 
regulatory capital has increased from $6.7 
bn to $8.7 bn from December 93 to May 95 
•  In June 1994, have been introduced stricter 
rules on loan loss provisioning. 
 
Brazil  1997  Good  •  Capital requirements were increased from 
8% to 10% 
•  Introduction of consolidated supervision 
 
India  1996  Good  • CAR of 8% (deliberated in 1991) become 
effective in March 1996  
• More restrictive loan classification 
procedure introduced 
• Strengthening of on-site supervision 
Korea  1997  Good  • In December 1997 the issuance of stricter 
loan classification and provisioning rules 
(which still fall behind international 
practices) was announced: it was planned to 
take place by July 1998. 
 
Malaysia  1997  Good  • In late 1997, after the crisis unfolded, new 
stricter loan classification and provisioning 
rules were announced.  The new rules 
should be substantially in line with best 
international practices.  Their 
implementation was supposed to start in  
January 1998.  The Malaysian authorities 
changed their mind later on, in September 
1998 
 
Mexico  1993  Weak  • Introduction of 8% CAR but weak 
accounting procedures (massive deferred 
tax credit in Tier 2) may have reduced the 
impact. 
 
Paraguay  1994  Weak  •  15% CAR has been introduced but there is 
evidence of weak enforcement. 
Thailand  1997  Good  • In late 1997, after the crisis unfolded, the 
issuance of new stricter loan classification 
and provisioning rules was announced.  The 
new rules should be in line with best 
international practices. Implementation was  
supposedly phased-in July 1998/end-2000.  
 
Turkey  1994  Good  • Introduction of 8% CAR 
 
Venezuela  1994  Good  •  Capital requirements were increased from 
3% to 6% (to 8% in the first quarter 1996) 
at a rate of 2% per year,  
• NPL were reduced from 15% to 7% of 
total loans   22 
Table 2: Identifying CAR Enforcement in Non-Crisis Countries 
 




Evidence of Stronger Enforcement 
Chile  1997  Good  • Introduction of 8% CAR 
 
Costa Rica  1998  Weak  • CAR is increased from 9% to 10% but is 
not binding  
• No evidence of previous evolution of 
capital regulation 
 
Hungary  1992 and 1994  Good  • 1992: stricter provisioning rules with a 
revised bankruptcy code made provisioning 
effective with negative effects on bank 
lending 
• 1994 
(a)   In December 1994, 8% CAR ( deliberated in 
1991) became effective 
(b)   New provisioning rules 
(c)   But capital is supplied by the public sector 
 
Poland  1993  Weak  • A public recapitalization plan of the banking 
system is undertaken which will put the 
system on a right track from there on 
 
Slovenia  1994  Weak  • There is an increase of CAR from 6.25% to 




Table 3: Further Evidence 
 




Evidence of Stronger Enforcement 
Morocco  1994  Good  • New 8% CAR have been deliberated in 
December 1993 to be in place by December 
1996.  Still the increase take place mostly in 
1994 may be due to an effective bank 
supervision structure. 
• In May 1993 a new law on loan accounting 
and provisioning is passed 
• In May 1993 stronger powers are awarded to 
bank supervisions 
South Africa    Lacking  • No indication of introduction of CAR; stable 
capital ratios; positive credit growth. 
Kenya    Lacking  • Weak enforcement and scarce information 
Tanzania    Lacking  • Lending freeze as a result of increasing NPL 
in 1992 
Nigeria    Lacking  • Not enough information 
Sri Lanka    Lacking  • No enforcement and decreasing capital 
requirement 
Israel    Lacking  • Lack of information on capital requirement 
enforcement   23 
Table 4 
The Bankscope Sample 
The table reports the number of banks by country included in the sample. For each country the 
percentage of foreign-owned banks, excluding the ownership held by other crisis and developing 
countries, is given. The percentage of under-capitalized banks is computed as the one of banks 
with CAR lower than the median level, by country, the year before the regulatory shock (i.e. at t-
1). The last column includes by country, the percentage of banks with an asset contraction 
occurring in year t or (t+1) or (t+2). 
 






in year t-1 
% Banks with 
asset contraction 
in t or t+1 or t+2 
Argentina  63  28.10  46.03  65.08 
Brazil  133  36.84  49.62  67.67 
India  71  4.23  49.30  28.17 
Korea  27  7.41  29.63  51.85 
Malaysia  62  16.13  43.55  87.10 
Mexico  19  15.79  36.84  52.63 
Paraguay  19  31.58  57.89  57.89 
Thailand  20  10.00  30.00  75.00 
Turkey  44  18.18  52.27  65.91 
Venezuela 
 
16  37.50  62.50  93.75 
TOTAL  474  25.74  46.84  63.08 
         
Non Crisis Countries         
Chile  32  46.88  50.00  46.88 
Costa Rica  15  13.33  40.00  40.00 
Hungary  23  52.17  34.78  56.52 
Poland  17  17.65  64.71  64.71 
Slovenia 
 
11  18.18  36.36  18.18 
TOTAL  98  34.69 
 
45.92  47.96 
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Table 5 
Crisis Countries- Bank Balance Sheet Statistics 
 
The table contains the percentage change in assets, capital, loans and deposits by country 
computed at the enforcement year, the year before and the two following years. The average 
capital asset ratio is also reported. Values are deflated by the annual consumer- price index. The 
sample excludes foreign owned (more than 30% foreign share holder) banks. Values in each 
columns are not strictly comparable due to missing observations. 
 
Countries  t -1  Enforcement 
Year t  
t+ 1  t+2 
Argentina    1993  1994  1995  1996 
Equity/Assets  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.16 
d Assets(%)  67.82  20.87  1.82  30.92 
d Loan (%)  44.05  27.16  -2.77  20.98 
d Deposit (%)  87.84  20.50  -1.76  26.63 
d Equity (%)   11.87  12.04  -1.01  -1.51 
Brazil   1996  1997  1998  1999 
Equity/Assets  0.19  0.17  0.21  0.17 
d Assets(%)  38.95  9.05  17.71  9.05 
d Loan (%)  26.39  -9.37  65.29  -9.37 
d Deposit (%)  41.89  31.50  52.13  31.50 
d Equity (%)   10.12  -7.08  4.05  -7.08 
India   1995  1996  1997  1998 
Equity/Assets  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
d Assets(%)  9.05  13.50  15.83  9.53 
d Loan (%)  22.23  9.11  12.73  6.24 
d Deposit (%)  7.97  18.59  15.88  8.30 
d Equity (%)   34.76  29.35  26.03  0.21 
Korea  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Equity/Assets  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.05 
d Assets(%)  19.41  18.54  7.96  16.75 
d Loan (%)  18.16  12.06  -15.90  15.25 
d Deposit (%)  19.31  13.90  33.24  24.04 
d Equity (%)   6.63  -7.33  -13.32  4.99 
Malaysia   1996  1997  1998  1999 
Equity/Assets  0.12  0.10  0.09  0.09 
d Assets(%)  30.30  29.41  -10.72  6.75 
d Loan (%)  37.63  27.12  -5.51  -0.73 
d Deposit (%)  30.31  31.35  -11.23  11.65 
d Equity (%)   37.66  26.05  -14.18  3.98 
Mexico   1992  1993  1994  1995 
Equity/Assets  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.05 
d Assets(%)  3.21  32.52  48.64  3.04 
d Loan (%)  22.02  30.35  40.86  6.00 
d Deposit (%)  4.93  25.40  40.83  10.12 
d Equity (%)   13.15  22.32  4.85  6.61 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Countries  t -1  Enforcement 
Year t  
t+ 1  t+2 
Paraguay   1993  1994  1995  1996 
Equity/Assets  0.09  0.12  0.12  0.13 
d Assets(%)  19.97  13.16  17.73  2.30 
d Loan (%)  23.49  11.82  31.86  -0.53 
d Deposit (%)  18.93  10.98  25.23  10.66 
d Equity (%)   56.44  67.61  24.68  12.98 
Thailand   1996  1997  1998  1999 
Equity/Assets  0.09  0.05  0.07  _ 
d Assets(%)  10.83  12.72  -8.57  _ 
d Loan (%)  13.86  13.97  -14.57  _ 
d Deposit (%)  10.45  16.05  -4.86  _ 
d Equity (%)   15.41  -32.04  -3.25  _ 
Turkey   1993  1994  1995  1996 
Equity/Assets  0.08  0.13  0.10  0.11 
d Assets(%)  42.51  -3.09  27.51  28.58 
d Loan (%)  55.90  6.10  61.05  59.79 
d Deposit (%)  71.94  6.52  49.17  192.98 
d Equity (%)   -19.30  4.02  11.39  24.45 
Venezuela   1993  1994  1995  1996 
Equity/Assets  0.12  0.09  0.11  0.14 
d Assets (%)  -16.10  30.15  -14.88  -9.08 
d Loan (%)  -10.95  -5.10  5.74  -6.27 
d Deposit (%)  -18.82  36.30  -15.84  -12.40 
d Equity (%)   5.95  21.56  2.95  13.94 
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Table 6 
Non Crisis Countries- Bank Balance Sheet Statistics 
 
The table contains the percentage change in assets, capital, l oans and deposits by country 
computed at the enforcement year, the year before and the two following years. The average 
capital asset ratio is also reported. Values are deflated by the annual consumer- price index. The 
sample excludes foreign owned (more than 30% foreign share holder) banks. Values in each 
columns are not strictly comparable due to missing observations. 
 
 
Countries  t –1  Enforcement 
Year t 
t+ 1  t+2 
Chile   1996  1997  1998  1999 
Equity/Assets  0.08  0.07  0.08  _ 
d Assets(%)  12.77  9.52  5.53  _ 
d Loans (%)  15.18  17.70  2.87  _ 
d Deposit (%)  11.57  7.48  7.68  _ 
d Equity (%)   5.74  4.57  12.23  _ 
Costa Rica   1996  1997   1998  1999 
Equity/Assets  0.15  0.12  0.10  0.12 
d Assets(%)  4.83  14.76  22.93  7.61 
d Loan (%)  -1.90  13.22  37.20  17.88 
d Deposit (%)  40.34  60.34  28.37  8.19 
d Equity (%)   -1.19  6.45  8.17  13.48 
Hungary   1993  1994  1995  1996 
Equity/Assets  0.18  0.18  0.16  0.12 
d Assets(%)  5.71  5.54  0.71  20.72 
d Loan (%)  -8.14  24.41  -19.73  -0.84 
d Deposit (%)  13.76  9.96  -5.48  24.40 
d Equity (%)   -22.40  1.88  15.53  -1.10 
Poland   1992  1993  1994  1995 
Equity/Assets  0.12  0.07  0.10  0.10 
d Assets(%)  8.84  0.19  5.91  12.62 
d Loan (%)  -3.07  -2.87  -3.46  34.27 
d Deposit (%)  7.68  -0.20  10.34  8.08 
d Equity (%)   -3.13  10.53  18.87  6.69 
Slovenia   1993  1994  1995  1996 
Equity/Assets  0.19  0.19  0.16  0.15 
d Assets(%)  33.04  26.19  24.58  11.88 
d Loan (%)  30.57  32.18  39.04  -5.11 
d Deposit (%)  54.33  119.31  27.78  13.73 
d Equity (%)  
 
31.83  13.25  12.45  2.59 
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Table 7 
Crisis Countries: Panel Regression 
The table reports panel regressions of equations (6) and (7) for the change in deposits and loans 
occurred in crisis countries the year before, the year of enforcement and the year after (i.e. at t-1, 
t, t+1).  
 
    Dep. Variable: D DD/A  Dep. Variable: D DL/A 
Variables    Coefficient (Stand. Error)  Coefficient (Stand. Error) 
Constant    -4.8875 (0.3651)***  -5.6219 (0.5266)*** 
DK/A     1.8306 (0.4308) ***   0.9234 (0.5996) 
K/A     3.1597 (0.2234)***   2.6376 (0.2970)*** 
K/A · DK/A    -3.0011 (0.8474)***   0.1231 (1.1642) 
Dsh · DK/A     0.1666 (0.3820)   1.2917 (0.6032)** 
Dfb · DK/A    -0.3067 (0.3445)  -1.5567 (0.5505)*** 
Log(A)     0.5150 (0.0414)***   0.5963 (0.0590)*** 
Dy(t)    -0.0114 (0.0277)  -0.0764 (0.0375)** 
Dy(t+1)    -0.0500 (0.0308) *   -0.0626 (0.0423) 
Growth in GDP     0.4534 (0.2630)*   0.3066 (0.3525) 
Interest rate    -0.0002 (0.0018)   0.0023 (0.0025) 
Loc.Cur./(US$·10000
) 
  -0.0006 (0.0008)  -0.0001 (0.001) 
N    466  464 
T     2.62  2.61 
2 R     0.40  0.26 
    F(465, 746) = 1.887  F(463, 737) = 1.379 
 
 
Note:   *     Significant at the 10 percent confidence level 
**   Significant at the 5 percent confidence level 
  *** Significant at the 1 percent confidence level 
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Table 8 
Crisis Countries: OLS regression at the enforcement year (at time t) 
 
    Dep. Variable: D DD/A  Dep. Variable: D DL/A 
Variables    Coefficient (Stand. Error)  Coefficient (Stand. Error) 
Constant    -0.2935 (0.1598)*  -0.1665 (0.1323) 
DK/A    2.0002 (1.1872)*  1.5888 (0.9577)* 
K/A    1.2460 (0.1945)***  0.7038 (0.1450)*** 
K/A · DK/A    3.6731 (2.3140)*  -4.1119 (1.6416)*** 
Dsh · DK/A    -0.9418 (1.1726)  0.9560 (0.9534) 
Dfb · DK/A    0.9309 (1.4422)  3.3856 (1.1838)*** 
Log(A)    0.0254 (0.0089)***  0.0122 (0.0073)* 
Growth in GDP    1.2317 (1.4114)  1.1943 (1.1729) 
Interest rate    -0.0013 (0.0021)  -0.0008 (0.0017) 
Loc.Cur./(US$·100)    -0.0003 (0.0005)   0.0002 (0.003) 
N    436  433 
2 R  
 




Crisis Countries: OLS Regression one year after the enforcement (at time t+1) 
 
    Dep. Variable: D DD/A  Dep. Variable: D DL/A 
Variables    Coefficient (Stand. Error)  Coefficient (Stand. Error) 
Constant    -0.2522 (0.0782)***  -0.4369 (0.1595)*** 
DK/A     0.8933 (0.3759)***  0.8790 (0.7715) 
K/A    1.0380 (0.1412)***  1.7822 (0.2985)*** 
K/A · DK/A    -0.4566 (0.8391)  6.6875 (2.0178)*** 
Dsh · DK/A    0.6612 (0.3820)*  2.1362 (0.8224)*** 
Dfb · DK/A    0.3597 (0.3496)  -2.3866 (0.8388)*** 
Log(A)    0.0262 (0.0063)***  0.0289 (0.0128)*** 
Growth in GDP    2.3089 (0.5119)***  1.7248 (1.0265)* 
Interest rate    -0.0038  (0.0017)***  0.0017 (0.0035) 
Loc.Cur./(US$·100)    -0.0006 (0.0003)***  -0.0002 (0.005) 
N    419  413 
2 R  
 
  0.30  0.18 
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Table 10 
Crisis Countries With Good Supporting Evidence: Panel Regression 
The table reports panel regressions of equations (6) and (7) for the change in deposits and loans 
occurred in crisis countries where we found good supporting evidence of an effective regulatory 
policy. The sample includes changes occurred the year before, the year of enforcement and the 
year after (i.e. at t-1, t, t+1).  
 
    Dep. Variable: D DD/A  Dep. Variable: D DL/A 
Variables    Coefficient (Stand. Error)  Coefficient (Stand. Error) 
Constant    -4.8574 (0.3787) ***  -5.7203 (0.5484)*** 
DK/A    1.8037 (0.4424) ***  0.8757 (0.6165) 
K/A    3.1514 (0.2288) ***  2.6328 (0.3043)*** 
K/A · DK/A    -2.9822 (0.8679)***  0.1458 (1.1928) 
Log(A)    0.5179 (0.0433) ***  0.5414 (0.0508)*** 
Dsh · DK/A    0.1784 (0.3917)  1.3131 (0.6197)*** 
Dfb · DK/A    -0.2907 (0.3531)  -1.5589 (0.5649)*** 
Dy(t)    -0.0119 (0.0297)  -0.0838 (0.0401)** 
Dy(t+1)    -0.0481 (0.0326)   -0.0555 (0.0446)  
Growth in GDP    0.4676 (0.2735)*  0.3717 (0.3663)* 
Interest Rate    -0.0001 (0.0020)  0.0032 (0.0027) 
Loc.Cur./(US$·10000
) 
  -0.0001 (0.0009)   0.0005 (0.0011) 
N    428  426 
T     2.68  2.67 
2 R     0.40  0.26 
    F(427, 708) =1.911 
 
F(425,699) = 1.411 
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Table 11 
Non Crisis Countries: Panel Regression 
In the table panel estimates of equations (8) and (9) for the change in deposits and loans occurred 
in non-crisis countries the year of enforcement and the two years after (i.e. at t, t+1, t+2).  
 
    Dep. Variable: D DD/A  Dep. Variable: D DL/A 
Variables    Coefficient (Stand. Error)  Coefficient (Stand. Error) 
Constant    -3.1708 (1.1117)***  -0.8572 (0.7470) 
K/A    2.1899 (0.3116)***   0.9864 (0.2416)*** 
Dlow · DK/A      2.8249 (1.4642)**   3.7816 (0.8555)*** 
Log(A)    0.2857 (0.0977)***   0.0793 (0.0662) 
Dy(t+1)     -0.0273 (0.0525)   0.0054 (0.0352) 
Dy(t+2)     -0.1370 (0.0905)*   0.0292 (0.0605) 
Growth in GDP      0.5534 (0.7466)   0.8002 (0.4991)* 
Interest rate     -0.0068 (0.0048)*   0.0046 (0.0033)* 
Loc.Cur./(US$)      0.0004 (0.0020)  -0.0010 (0.0013) 
N    98  97 
T     2.58  2.59 
2 R     0.30  0.27 
    F(97,147) = 2.317 
 




Non Crisis Countries: Panel Regression 
The table reports panel regressions of the equations (8) and (9) (but with Dsh replacing the 
dummy Dlow) for the change in deposits and loans occurred in non-crisis countries the year of 
enforcement and the two years after (i.e. at t, t+1, t+2).  
 
    Dep. Variable: D DD/A  Dep. Variable: D DL/A 
Variables    Coefficient (Stand. Error)  Coefficient (Stand. Error) 
Constant    -3.0596 (1.1192)***  -1.0098 (0.7839) 
K/A     2.2432 (0.3164)***  0.9710 (0.2562)*** 
Dsh · DK/A     1.5132 (0.8938)*   1.2878 (0.6065)*** 
Log(A)     0.2660 (0.0989)***  0.0860 (0.0698) 
Dy(t+1)    -0.0346 (0.0528)  -0.0068 (0.0369) 
Dy(t+2)    -0.1464 (0.0906)*  0.0127 (0.0633) 
Growth in GDP     0.5988 (0.7478)  0.7428 (0.5237) 
Interest rate    -0.0070 (0.0048)  0.0059 (0.0034)* 
Loc.Cur./(US$)     0.0008 (0.0020)  -0.0006 (0.0014) 
N    98  97 
T     2.58  2.59 
2 R     0.30  0.19 
    F(97,147) = 2.303 
 
F(96,146) = 1.705 
 